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In this paper, we study the positive and normative implications of financial shocks in a
standard New Keynesian model that includes banks and frictions in the market for bank
capital. We show how such frictions influence materially the effects of bank liquidity
shocks and the properties of optimal policy. In particular, they limit the scope for
countercyclical monetary policy in the face of these shocks. A fiscal policy instrument can
complement monetary policy by offsetting the balance-sheet effects of these shocks, and
jointly optimal policies attain the same equilibrium that monetary policy (alone) could
attain in the absence of equity-market frictions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The 2007–2009 financial crisis was the impetus for major changes in the practice
of central banking, and in our models of monetary policy.1 The new models,
understandably, focused mostly on analyzing the origins of this particular crisis or
the policy responses that had already taken shape. Now, with the crisis hopefully
behind us, it seems natural to ask how it has changed our understanding of stabi-
lization policy and the role of banks in the transmission mechanism, during normal
times. How are liquidity problems that affect the funding side of banks (say, in
the interbank market) transmitted to the lending side, and what is the appropriate
policy response? Is there an appropriate role for fiscal or quasi-fiscal policy tools
(such as a capital infusion into the banking sector) during normal times?
The answers to these questions depend on what we assume about the presence
and nature of frictions that banks face in debt and equity markets. The goals of
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this paper are to make the role of such frictions transparent using a simple New
Keynesian model with banks, and to highlight issues that we think remain to be
addressed before we can move toward quantitative models of monetary policy
with a banking sector.
It seems intuitive (and our model will illustrate) that a fiscal instrument allowing
a cash infusion into banks can be a valuable policy tool if a friction in equity
markets prevents banks from recapitalizing themselves. Absent such a friction,
the funding and lending sides of banks are decoupled (in a model where the
Modigliani–Miller theorem applies), and a “liquidity crunch” is harder to model.
In this case, a simple model with no externalities or information asymmetries
would tell us that stock holders will fund any lending projects that are worthwhile.
And the case for policy intervention seems harder to make; in particular, a fiscal
transfer to banks may simply induce them to pay more dividends, without altering
their lending or other activities.2 Similarly, giving banks access to any frictionless
source of funding (say, commercial paper) would suffice to decouple their funding
and lending sides in a simple model.
The 2007–2009 crisis essentially shut down the funding side of banks in the in-
terbank, securitization, and commercial-paper markets simultaneously. The sheer
magnitude and breadth of the crisis apparently convinced policy makers that banks
were not in a position to recapitalize themselves in equity markets.3 Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010) analyze the effects of shutting down the interbank market in a
model with no market for bank equity. In their model—and in the models of Meh
and Moran (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011), and others—bankers have some
personal net worth (they cannot issue equity) and face a borrowing limit due to an
agency problem. This is why a liquidity crunch affects bank lending and has real
effects in these models.
In this paper, we examine the implications of the standard New Keynesian
model with banks that have access to equity finance but face frictions in adjusting
their capital.4 The banks in our model issue equity, pay dividends, and maximize
their stock-market value. Absent frictions in the equity market, it may be optimal
to make the equity payout negative—which amounts to paying negative dividends
(in the model) and corresponds to new equity issues (in reality)—under some
realizations of shocks. To illustrate the role of an equity-market friction, we
compare the frictionless model with the same model under the dividend-smoothing
specification of Jermann and Quadrini (2009, 2012).5 This ad hoc feature allows
us to show how optimal policy changes as we vary the smoothing parameter;
but our model is not suitable for a quantitative exercise. We should note, on this
front, that the other models we mentioned previously involve assumptions that are
equivalent to our dividend-smoothing assumption.6 Gertler et al. (2012) provide
an alternative framework in which the composition of the balance sheets of banks
(equity vs. debt) plays a key role in the response of the economy to various shocks
and also for the nature of optimal policy. In their model, banks can issue equity;
but the agency problem that limits debt finance in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)
also applies to equity finance in Gertler et al.’s (2012) setup. Again, this friction
is equivalent to our dividend-smoothing assumption.
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For the specifications with and without dividend smoothing, we characterize the
optimal (Ramsey) monetary policy as well as the optimal joint monetary and fiscal
policy—where the latter takes the form of a direct transfer to banks—in the face
of financial and other shocks. A (negative) liquidity shock causes an increase in
the demand for bank reserves. The version of our model with a frictionless equity
market has strong implications because it allows banks to recapitalize themselves
easily. In this setting, the lending and borrowing sides of banks become decoupled.
The spread between the lending rate and the risk-free (Consumption Capital Asset
Pricing Model, henceforth CCAPM) rate does not depend on the liquidity shock.
Furthermore, the decoupling of the lending and borrowing sides eliminates the
need for fiscal intervention. In contrast, in the version of our model with an
equity-market friction (dividend smoothing), a liquidity shock (modeled as an
increase in the demand for excess reserves) increases the spread between the
lending rate and the risk-free (CCAPM) rate and reduces the volume of loans. A
fiscal cash infusion reduces the spread and increases the volume of loans. Indeed,
in our model, the availability of a fiscal instrument serves precisely to undo the
constraint that the equity-market friction imposes on optimal monetary policy.
That is, optimal policy with the fiscal and monetary instruments under the equity-
market friction implements exactly the same equilibrium as optimal policy with
only the monetary instrument under a frictionless equity market (in which case,
the fiscal instrument is redundant).7
Two observations seem in order about modeling choices. First, for concreteness,
we model our liquidity shock as an increase in demand for excess reserves. But
we could make the same points in the context of any other shock that tightens
bank funding. In particular, the points we make would also apply to shocks that
hamper loan securitization or issuance of commercial paper. Second, we focus on
comparing models with and without friction in the market for bank equity. But the
relevant comparison is between a model in which all the markets that banks use to
fund themselves have frictions and models in which there is at least one frictionless
market. For example, a model in which there is no friction in the commercial-paper
or securitization market is equivalent to our model with no financial friction—the
funding and lending sides of bank are decoupled. This suggests that an attempt to
build a more quantitative model of liquidity shocks would face the daunting task
of calibrating frictions in all the markets that banks use for funding.
In what follows, Sections 2 and 3 present our model and the parameter values
used for our simulations. Section 4 reports our results on Ramsey policy and
comparisons with simple rules for monetary policy. In Section 5, we discuss
perspectives from the existing literature that may offer a more structural alternative
for our dividend smoothing assumption. Section 6 contains a brief summary and
conclusions.
2. MODEL
We consider an economy populated with infinitely lived households, monopolis-
tically competitive banks and firms producing differentiated intermediate goods,
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perfectly competitive firms producing the final good, and fiscal and monetary
authorities. Our rendition of households and their demand for money is closely
related to the standard Lucas and Stokey (1983) setup with cash goods and credit
goods, often used in the normative literature [e.g., Chari et al. (1991); Correia et al.
(2008)]. To incorporate a demand for deposits in the model, we assume that the
consumption good is a Cobb–Douglas aggregate over a good that can be bought
with cash and a good that can be bought using deposits. We let “leisure” implicitly
serve as the credit good in our model.
Each period is divided into two subperiods: a financial exchange followed by a
goods exchange. In the financial exchange, after the realization of current shocks,
retailers borrow from banks to buy the intermediate goods and assemble the final
good to be sold to consumers, the government, and banks (in the version of the
model with costly banking); households pay taxes and choose their asset portfolios,
acquiring the money and deposits that they plan to use in the subsequent goods
exchange; and firms producing intermediate goods pay wages and dividends with
the proceeds of their sales to retailers. In the goods exchange, households use
money and deposits to buy goods from the retailers that have not been hit by
a default shock (those who have been hit by the shock end up not producing
anything). We assume that the government buys goods with cash (although this is
inconsequential for our analysis). Retailers must wait until the following financial
exchange to use the cash and liquidate the deposits that they acquire; so they are
indifferent between these means of payment and set the same price for cash and
deposit goods.
2.1. Households
The representative household gets utility from consumption and disutility from
work,
Ut = Et
⎧⎨
⎩
+∞∑
j=0
βj
[
 ln
(
cMt+j
) + (1 − ) ln (cDt+j ) − 11 + χ h1+χt+j
]⎫⎬
⎭ ,
with 0 < β < 1, 0 <  < 1, and χ > 0, where cMt and c
D
t denote consumption
of cash goods and deposits goods at date t , respectively, and ht stands for hours
worked (in the intermediate-goods sector).
The household’s budget constraint, in real terms, is(
1 + RAt−1
t
)
at−1 +
[(
1 + RDt−1
t
)
dt−1 −
cDt−1
t
]
+
(
mHt−1
t
− c
M
t−1
t
)
+wtht + πIt + zt − at − mHt − dt − tt ≥ 0, (1)
where t ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is the inflation rate, dt deposits, 1 + RDt the gross nominal
interest rate on deposits, mHt money balances held by the household, wt wages, π
I
t
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the profits of firms producing intermediate goods, zt the dividends paid by banks,
and tt a lump-sum tax. The variables are represented by a lowercase letter when
expressed in real terms and by an uppercase letter when expressed in nominal
terms. The asset at represents the household’s portfolio of nominally risk-free
bonds, and 1 + RAt is the gross nominal CCAPM interest rate. Risk-free nominal
bonds may be issued by the government, banks, or other households (although, in
equilibrium, the latter will be in zero net supply). In our simple setup, securitization
of loans (with banks absorbing any default cost) is equivalent to banks issuing
risk-free bonds. So we can also include in at any securitization of bank loans.8
The households’ optimization problem is
Max
at ,c
M
t ,c
D
t ,m
H
t ,dt ,ht
Ut ,
subject to the cash- and deposits-in-advance constraints
mHt − cMt ≥ 0,
dt − cDt ≥ 0,
and the budget constraint (1). The first-order conditions of this optimization prob-
lem are

cMt
− μMt − βEt
{
λt+1
t+1
}
= 0,
1 − 
cDt
− μDt − βEt
{
λt+1
t+1
}
= 0,
μMt + βEt
{
λt+1
t+1
}
− λt = 0,
μDt + β
(
1 + RDt
)
Et
{
λt+1
t+1
}
− λt = 0,
−hχt + wtλt = 0,
β
(
1 + RAt
)
Et
{
λt+1
t+1
}
− λt = 0, (2)
where μMt , μ
D
t , and λt are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the cash-in-
advance, deposits-in-advance, and budget constraints, respectively.
2.2. Intermediate Goods Producers
There is a unit mass of monopolistically competitive firms producing intermediate
goods. Firm j operates the production function
xt (j) = ht (j) exp
(
η
p
t
)
,
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where ηpt is an exogenous productivity shock. We assume that firms set their prices
à la Calvo.
2.3. Final Goods Producers
Producers of the final good—henceforth, “retailers”—are perfectly competitive.
They use xt (j) units of each intermediate good j ∈ [0, 1] to produce yt units of
the final good with
yt =
[∫ 1
0
xt (j)
ε−1
ε dj
] ε
ε−1
, (3)
where ε > 1. We assume that each final-good firm is hit by a default shock
with probability δt . A firm hit by the default shock uses the inputs but does not
produce any output. Assuming independent realizations across firms, total output
is (1 − δt )yt . As we elaborate in the following, our retailers will borrow from
banks, and both parties observe the probability of default before they enter the
loan contract.9
Intermediate good j sells for the nominal price P Xt (j). We break the retailer’s
optimization problem into two parts. First, the cost minimization problem involves
choosing xt (j) for all j ∈ [0, 1] to minimize∫ 1
0
P Xt (j)xt (j)dj,
given yt and subject to the constraint imposed by the production function (3). This
implies
xt (j) =
[
P Xt (j)
P Xt
]−ε
yt , (4)
where
P Xt ≡
[∫ 1
0
P Xt (j)
1−ε dj
] 1
1−ε
(5)
is the marginal (and average) cost of producing yt .
Second, retailers must borrow from banks to buy intermediate goods:10
P Xt
Pt
xt = lt , (6)
where Pt is the price of the final good. The zero-profit condition of retailers implies
Pt =
(
1 + RLt
)
P Xt . (7)
So Pt is just a markup over the cost P Xt of acquiring the goods, and the markup
factor is the interest rate on loans. The zero-profit condition of retailers has the
following interpretation. A one-period entrant at time t could borrow Lt , buy
intermediate goods, and sell them for Ptyt . Next period, the potential entrant
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would have exactly Ptyt = (1 + RLt )Lt to pay off the bank loan, with no profit or
loss.
2.4. Banks
Banks are owned by households and have some market power in setting the interest
rates on deposits and loans.11 As in Gerali et al. (2010), this market power comes
from monopolistic competition in the deposit market and the loan market. The
representative final goods producer borrows a CES aggregate of differentiated
loans, and the representative household holds a CES aggregate of differentiated
deposits. Thus, a bank setting the gross nominal interest rate 1+RLt that it charges
on its loans lt faces the demand curve
lt =
(
1 + RLt
1 + RLt
)−γl
lt , (8)
where γl > 1 is the exogenous elasticity of substitution between differentiated
loans. Similarly, a bank setting the gross nominal interest rate, 1 +RDt , paid on its
deposits, dt , faces
dt =
(
1 + RDt
1 + RDt
)γd
dt , (9)
where γd > 1 is the exogenous elasticity of substitution between differentiated
deposits. Gerali et al. (2010) derive these demand curves from the first-order
condition for optimality of final goods producers’ portfolio of differentiated loans
and the first-order condition for optimality of households’ portfolio of differen-
tiated deposits.12 The variables with an upper bar (dt , lt , R
D
t , R
L
t ) denote the
corresponding average variables. All banks are identical and set the same interest
rates in a symmetric equilibrium.
Banks hold reserves mBt to manage the liquidity of deposits:
mBt = dt exp
(
ηdt
)
, (10)
where ηdt is an exogenous reserves demand shock. The representative bank chooses
the amount of dividends zt and the amount of securities at (both introduced in
Subsection 2.1), as well as mBt , R
D
t , and R
L
t , to maximize its stock-market value
Et
⎧⎨
⎩
+∞∑
j=0
βjλt+j zt+j
⎫⎬
⎭ ,
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subject to (8)–(10), and the cash-flow constraint
zt = at + dt + (1 − δt−1)
(
1 + RLt−1
t
)
lt−1 + 1
t
mBt−1
− a
2
(at − a∗)2 −
(
1 + RAt−1
t
)
at−1 −
(
1 + RDt−1
t
)
dt−1
−lt − mBt − τt −
z
2
(zt − z∗)2, (11)
with a ≥ 0 and z ≥ 0, where δt is the default rate, and τt a tax (when positive)
or transfer (when negative) financed by taxing households. To study the responses
of endogenous variables to a fiscal transfer to banks, we set
τt = τss − ετt , (12)
where ετt is an exogenous shock and, for any variable vt , vss denotes the steady
state value of vt . Setting a = 0 leads to a standard setup with a frictionless market
for nominally riskless debt or securitization. With a > 0, our banks face a cost
of issuing an amount of securities at different from a∗. In our simulations, a > 0
corresponds to the case where banks face increasing marginal costs of borrowing
(or securitizing) amounts above a∗. This is a smooth version of the borrowing
limit implied by the agency problem in the models of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010),
Meh and Moran (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011), and Gertler et al. (2012).13
When z > 0, banks face a cost of setting dividends different from z∗. In our
simulations, z > 0 corresponds to the case where paying dividends below z∗
hurts the stock-market value of banks.
In a symmetric equilibrium, the first-order conditions of this maximization
problem are
λt − λzt
[
1 + z
(
zt − z∗
)] = 0, (13)
λzt [1 − a(at − a∗)] − β
(
1 + RAt
)
Et
{
λzt+1
t+1
}
= 0, (14)
(
1 + RLt
1 + RAt
)
[1 − a(at − a∗)] (1 − δt ) − γl
γl − 1 = 0, (15)
1 − a (at − a∗)
1 + RAt
− 1 + λ
d
t
λzt
= 0,
(
1 + RDt
1 + RAt
)
[1 − a(at − a∗)] − γd
γd + 1
(
1 − ηdt
λdt
λzt
)
= 0,
where λdt and λ
z
t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with equations (10) and
(11), respectively. Note that there is a monopoly markup on the lending rate and
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a monopoly “markdown” on the deposit rate. Note also that the risk premium,
which is determined by equation (15), depends positively on the default rate and,
in the presence of equity market frictions (a > 0), on banks’ marginal cost of
issuing risk-free securities.
2.5. Fiscal and Monetary Authorities
Government purchases gt are exogenous and follow an AR(1) process. For con-
creteness, we assume that the fiscal authority uses cash to pay for its purchases,
mGt = gt ,
but this does not matter for our results. Because Ricardian equivalence holds in
our model, we do not need to model the dynamics of public debt explicitly.14 We
can just assume that the fiscal authority maintains a balanced budget and sets
tt = gt − τt .
When we consider the model under a simple monetary policy rule (i.e., when we
conduct our positive analysis), we will use a rule such as
(
1 + RAt
) = (1 + RAt−1)ρ
[(
1 + RAss
) (Xt
ss
)θm]1−ρ
, (16)
where Xt ≡ P Xt /P Xt−1, 0 ≤ ρ < 1, and θm > 1 (to ensure local equilibrium deter-
minacy), or the equivalent rule reacting to CPI inflation. The monetary authority
sets the interest rate RAt according to one of these rules, and adjusts money supply
mt to clear the money market at this interest rate. In our normative analysis, we
will compare these rules with optimal (Ramsey) policy.
2.6. Market Clearing Conditions
The goods market clearing condition is
(1 − δt ) yt = ct + gt + a
2
(at − a∗)2 + z
2
(zt − z∗)2,
and the money market clearing condition is
mt = mHt + mBt + mGt .
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2.7. Shock Processes
We assume that ετt is a white noise (with standard deviation στ ) and that the other
shocks follow autoregressive processes of order one:
η
p
t = ρpηpt−1 + εpt ,
log (gt ) = (1 − ρg) log (gss) + ρg log (gt−1) + εgt ,
ηdt = (1 − ρd) ηdss + ρdηdt−1 + εdt ,
log (δt ) = (1 − ρδ) log (δss) + ρδ log (δt−1) + εδt ,
where ρp, ρg , ρd , and ρδ are parameters between zero and one, whereas ε
p
t , ε
g
t ,
εdt , and ε
δ
t are white noises (with standard deviations σp, σg , σd , and σδ).
2.8. Frictionless Equity Market
The special case of our model with a frictionless equity market (z = 0) has a
number of strong implications. In this case, (13) implies λt = λzt . Then, combining
(14) with (2), we see that the marginal cost of borrowing (or securitization) is zero.
If we set a∗ = 0 (so that any borrowing or securitization is costly), banks will not
borrow or issue securities. Note that this implication is not due to the functional
forms we assume for costs. The more general point is that banks should not
undertake costly borrowing or securitization if they can issue equity (freely adjust
dividends), get funds at the CCAPM rate from their owners, and save the costs of
borrowing or securitization.
Also, in this case, (15) implies that the spread between the lending rate and the
risk-free (CCAPM) rate fluctuates only in response to default shocks. Moreover,
in this case, the lump-sum tax or transfer τt has no effect, except on the banks’
dividend payments zt . All these implications of the model are removed once we
allow for a friction in the equity market (z > 0).
3. PARAMETERIZATION
Our model has a number of parameters that are hard to calibrate. These parameter
values do not play an important role in our results because our presentation will
highlight qualitative features of optimal policies.15 Most importantly, we do not
have any strong priors for setting our dividend-smoothing parameter z. Jermann
and Quadrini (2009, 2012) provide three different values, ranging from essentially
0 to 0.46, for the U.S. nonfinancial business sector (using the same data set starting
in the 1980s but three different approaches to estimation or calibration). We will set
z = 0.25 in our benchmark model (allowing for dividend smoothing by banks).
We will also set a = 0.25 in our benchmark model. These are arbitrary choices,
and our discussion will compare the benchmark model with an alternative model
setting z = a = 0.16 The default rate is 0.86% in the steady state (the average
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charge-off rate for U.S. bank loans from 1985Q1 to 2008Q3). We set  = 0.43
as the share of cash goods in consumption, following Chari et al. (1991). Given
this value, the model pins down the steady state level of deposits and their share
in funding bank loans.
We set a∗ = ass and treat it as securitization. Banks securitize 19% of their
loans in the steady state (the ratio of securitized consumer and real estate loans to
bank credit, for U.S. commercial banks, in August 2008). We assume that bank
reserves are 7.6% of deposits in the steady state (the ratio of aggregate reserves
of depository institutions to deposits in the United States in August 2008, where
deposits are measured as M1 minus currency outside banks). The bank’s balance
sheet identity then pins down the value of zss . We set z∗ = zss . We set γd to make
the interest rate on deposits 2% per annum. We set γl to make the interest rate on
loans 8.4% per annum (so, adjusting for the default rate, our prime rate would be
5% per annum, close to the average prime rate after 1980). In our simple rule for
monetary policy, we set the inertia parameter to 0.8 and the (long-run) response
to inflation to 1.5. Finally, we set the steady-state gross inflation rate per quarter
to its optimal value, equal to 0.9996. We explain later how this value is obtained
and comment upon it.
The standard deviations of our shocks to productivity and government purchases
take standard values. Our tax shock (fiscal transfer to the banking sector) is only
for illustrative purposes and its size does not matter for our analysis.17 For each
shock following an AR(1) process, we set the inertia parameter equal to 0.9.
We set the standard deviation of our default shock innovation so that an increase
in the charge-off rate of the magnitude observed during the recent financial crisis
would occur on the average once in 80 years in our model. In the data, the average
charge-off rate from 1985Q1 to 2008Q3 was 0.86%; the rate grew to 2.88% in
2009Q3. Under our parameterization, an increase of this magnitude over four
quarters has probability 1/320, given our AR(1) process and assuming that the
innovation has a Gaussian distribution.18 So a randomly selected quarter may be
the start of a large four-quarter increase in the default rate on the average every
320 quarters or 80 years, which roughly corresponds to the time elapsed between
the Great Depression and the recent crisis.
Similarly, we set the standard deviation of the reserves demand shock innovation
so that, starting from its steady-state value of 7.6% (the August 2008 figure), the
reserves-to-deposits ratio reaches at least 107% (the August 2009 figure) in one
year’s time with probability 1/320.
The parameter values are shown in Table 1.
4. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We used Michel Juillard’s software Dynare to log-linearize and simulate our
model.19 We solved for the optimal (Ramsey) policy using Dynare and the program
Get Ramsey developed by Levin and López-Salido (2004). The optimal steady
state rate of inflation in our model has to strike a balance between two forces,
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1365100513000795
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 17:24:27, subject to the Cambridge Core
1206 HARRIS DELLAS, BEHZAD DIBA, AND OLIVIER LOISEL
TABLE 1. Calibration
Parameter Description Value
Preferences
β Discount factor 0.99
χ Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply 1
 Share of cash goods in consumption 0.43
Technology
γ Elasticity in the goods aggregator 7
Nominal rigidities
α Probability Calvo fairy does not visit price setter 0.75
Banking aspects
γd Elasticity in the deposits aggregator 230
γl Elasticity in the loans aggregator 420
a Adjustment-cost parameter for securities 0 or 0.25
z Adjustment-cost parameter for dividends 0 or 0.25
Monetary policy
ρ Degree of inertia in interest-rate rule 0.8
θm Coefficient on inflation in interest-rate rule 1.5
Steady-state values
πss S.-s. gross inflation rate per quarter 0.9996
δss S.-s. default rate per quarter 0.0086
ηdss S.-s. reserve ratio 0.076
gss
(1−δss )yss S.-s. share of government purchases in output 0.25
ass
lss
S.-s. ratio of bank borrowing (securities) to loans 0.19
τss S.-s. lump-sum tax on banks 0
Shock processes
ρp Inertia in productivity shock 0.9
ρg Inertia in government-expenditures shock 0.9
ρd Inertia in shock to demand for reserves 0.9
ρδ Inertia in default shock 0.9
σp Stand. dev. of productivity shock innovation 0.0086
σg Stand. dev. of govt.-expenditures shock innovation 0.010
σd Stand. dev. of reserves-demand shock innovation 0.56
σδ Stand. dev. of default shock innovation 0.26
στ Stand. dev. of fiscal transfer to banks 0.010
as Khan et al. (2003) point out in the context of their model with a monetary
friction and price rigidity. First, because a positive nominal interest rate distorts
the household’s labor–leisure decision, optimal policy would follow the Friedman
Rule—a deflationary policy keeping the nominal interest rate equal to zero—if
prices were fully flexible. Second, price rigidity, by itself, would call for price
stability—keeping the inflation rate equal to zero—if there were no monetary
distortion (as in standard NK models). In our model—as in several earlier models
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FIGURE 1. Responses to productivity shock.
such as Khan et al. (2003)—optimal steady state inflation is close to zero; so the
normative force calling for price stability dominates the monetary frictions that
call for the Friedman Rule.20
4.1. Benchmark Model
Figures 1–3 display the impulse-response functions (IRFs) of selected variables
in response to shocks in our benchmark model with (a,z) = (0.25, 0.25) (i.e.,
in the presence of equity market frictions). Each figure shows the responses under
our two simple rules, reacting to the inflation measures  and X, and under
optimal (Ramsey) monetary policy. We do not optimize over the fiscal instrument
(we set the transfer equal to zero) for the results reported in these figures.
The solid lines show the IRFs under a simple rule reacting to CPI inflation
(). The responses to familiar shocks (in Figures 1 and 2) are in accordance
with conventional wisdom. A positive productivity shock raises output and low-
ers inflation. A positive government-expenditures shock raises output, lending,
inflation, and interest rates, but decreases private consumption because of the
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FIGURE 2. Responses to government-expenditures shock.
familiar Ricardian effect. Following a positive shock to the demand for reserves
(Figure 3), output, hours, private consumption, and lending decrease, while infla-
tion and interest rates rise.
Why is an increase in the demand for reserves inflationary in our model? When
banks need more reserves, their balance sheets tighten and they want to lend less.
Lending rates rise and the associated cost increases the price of final goods. The
higher prices curb aggregate demand and reduce consumption, output, and hours.
These effects, and the effect on prices of intermediate goods, however, are fairly
small.21 The responses in Figure 3 illustrate that shocks to demand for reserves
work like adverse supply shocks in our model.
The direct positive effect of the lending rate on inflation comes from the presence
of a cost channel in our model (more specifically, from our assumption that final
goods producers borrow from banks to buy intermediate goods, so that variations
in the lending rate affect their cost of production). Barth and Ramey (2001) and
Ravenna and Walsh (2006) provide empirical evidence, based on industry-level and
aggregate data, that is suggestive of a direct positive interest-rate effect on inflation
through a cost channel. And several DSGE models incorporate a cost channel by
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FIGURE 3. Responses to shock to demand for reserves.
assuming that firms must pay (at least part of) their factors of production before
they receive revenues from sales, and must borrow to finance these payments [e.g.,
Christiano et al. (2005) and Ravenna and Walsh (2006)].22
Our stylized model may well overstate some consequences of a simple rule that
reacts to CPI inflation. In the model, banks raise the lending rate when they are
less eager to lend and retailers pass on the cost of borrowing to consumers right
away (there is no rigidity in retail prices). So the CPI inflation rate in our model
is quite sensitive to financial shocks. If monetary policy responds to this measure
of inflation, then the effects of shocks on endogenous variables also reflect the
resulting changes in the policy stance. The dashed lines in Figures 1–3 show the
corresponding IRFs assuming that the simple monetary rule responds to inflation
in the price index for intermediate goods (X), as specified in (16). Because X is
less sensitive to financial shocks, these IRFs do not reflect endogenous monetary
responses as much as the solid lines (the IRFs under the simple rule responding to
CPI inflation) do. Also, the conventional wisdom of NK models linking optimal
policy to inflation targeting applies more naturally to our simple rule reacting to
inflation in the price index for intermediate goods, X.
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The lines that are both dashed and dotted show the IRFs under optimal (Ramsey)
monetary policy. In Figure 1, optimal policy allows somewhat larger increases in
output and consumption and opts for a smaller decrease in inflation than our
simple rule targeting CPI inflation. In particular, optimal policy essentially keeps
inflation in the price index for intermediate goods unchanged but tolerates some
volatility in CPI inflation. This property is due to the fact that the CPI, unlike
intermediate goods inflation, is affected through the cost channel. And we know
from Ravenna and Walsh (2006) that the presence of a cost channel introduces a
trade-off between output and price stability. Note that optimal policy also keeps
X closer to zero in response to a shock to government purchases (Figure 2).
Following a shock that increases the demand for reserves, optimal policy (Figure
3) allows output, consumption, labor hours, and lending to fall. To bring about the
decrease in the volume of loans as an equilibrium outcome, lending rates must
rise; and this increases CPI inflation. Optimal policy cuts the policy rate (slightly)
and allows a large monetary expansion in response to the increase in demand
for reserves. The optimal monetary expansion is reminiscent of Poole’s (1970)
analysis of how policy should respond to money-demand shocks in the IS-LM
model.
Compared with optimal policy, our simple rule responding to CPI inflation
tolerates much larger contractions in output, consumption, and hours when the
demand for reserves increases. The difference arises from the fact that the simple
rule raises the policy rate to fight inflation, whereas optimal policy cuts the policy
rate to moderate the contraction. Once again, the simple rule reacting to X comes
closer to optimal policy.
We calculate the welfare losses from simple rules relative to optimal policy and
express these welfare losses as consumption equivalents, following Lucas (2003).
The computed welfare losses are quite small. For instance, the rule involving a
response to inflation in the price index for intermediate goods entails a welfare
loss of only 0.03% compared to optimal policy. That is, augmenting consumption
by 0.03% each period would be enough to compensate consumers for living under
the simple rule, instead of having the fully optimal policy in effect. In this sense,
the normative punchline of simple NK models applies to our model: a simple rule
that stabilizes the “right” measure of inflation is optimal, or very close to optimal.
Given that our simple rule reacting to X comes so close to optimal policy
(has a welfare loss of 0.03% of consumption), we do not explore the possibility
that another rule (perhaps reacting to the welfare-relevant output gap) performs
even better. We can, however, identify rules that do quite poorly. One example
is a commonly used version of a Taylor rule with values of 0.8 for the inertia
parameter, 1.5 for the long-run response to CPI inflation, and 0.5 for the long-run
response to the output gap relative to the steady state. The welfare cost of using
this policy is 0.58% of consumption each period. We also consider a rule that
sets an almost constant growth rate for the money supply.23 The welfare cost of
this policy is 1.26% of consumption per period. This is not surprising: as we
saw previously, optimal policy allows money growth to fluctuate considerably
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FIGURE 4. Responses to shock to demand for reserves in the absence of equity market
frictions.
in response to liquidity shocks in our model. A money supply rule hinders such
optimal variation in the money supply and can lead to significant welfare losses
[as discussed by Collard and Dellas (2005)].
4.2. Frictionless Equity Market
Although the preceding results from our benchmark model mostly accord with
familiar views, we obtained these results by setting a = z = 0.25. What
happens if we set a = z = 0, instead? The optimal responses to shocks
to productivity and government purchases do not change. Optimal responses to
our liquidity shock (increase in demand for reserves), however, change when we
remove the equity-market friction (Figure 4). First of all, compared to Figure 3, the
contractionary effects of this liquidity shock on output, consumption, and hours
are an order of magnitude smaller. In Figure 3 (with the equity-market friction)
the contraction reflected the increase in bank lending rates in response to tighter
balance sheet conditions. In Figure 4 (without the equity-market friction), balance
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FIGURE 5. Responses to fiscal transfer to banks.
sheet conditions do not play a role, and lending rates actually fall by a small
amount.24 In this case, the increase in money demand has the familiar (but small)
deflationary effect.25
As we pointed out earlier (based on the relevant first-order conditions), banks
do not engage in costly securitization (or borrowing) if they have access to funds
in a frictionless equity market. If we set z = 0 and a > 0, our model implies
that at = a∗. And if we set z > 0 and a = 0, our banks adjust at in response
to the liquidity shock.
4.3. The Fiscal Instrument
As we noted earlier, a fiscal transfer to banks has no effect in the absence of
the equity-market friction—it is simply paid out as dividends. To provide some
intuition for the potential role of fiscal policy in the presence of funding frictions,
Figure 5 shows the effects of a fiscal transfer to banks, reducing τ in (12) from
its steady state value of 0 to −0.01. This transfer increases the banks’ cash flow
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FIGURE 6. Responses to shock to demand for reserves.
and makes them more willing to lend. So they cut the interest rate on loans, which
reduces consumer prices upon impact and stimulates spending.
We consider again optimal policy under funding frictions, with a = z =
0.25, but this time assume that the fiscal instrument can be used in addition to
monetary policy. Optimal policy makes a transfer to banks when the demand for
reserves increases. This shock also calls for a monetary response. In Figure 6, this
monetary response and the responses of other variables virtually coincide with
the ones under optimal monetary policy in the absence of a friction in the equity
market. For example, under jointly optimal policies, there is a small increase in
output, as is the case under optimal monetary policy in the frictionless model. In
contrast, lacking the fiscal instrument, optimal monetary policy has to tolerate a
decrease in output when there is a friction in the equity market. These findings
are intuitive. The fiscal instrument is essentially used to offset the friction in the
equity market, and optimal monetary policy opts for essentially the same solution
that it would choose in the absence of this friction.
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The basic message of this subsection—and, more generally, of the paper—is left
unchanged when the analysis is broadened to other kinds of bank liquidity shocks.
All kinds of liquidity shocks will have essentially the same qualitative—positive
and normative—implications, because in the presence of equity-market frictions
they will tighten banks’ balance sheets (i.e., make banks choose between cutting
loans and cutting dividends) in the same way. Suppose, for instance, that banks
now face the cost a2
[
at − a∗ exp
(−zst )]2 of issuing an amount of securities at ,
where zst is a shock to the costs of securitization. Under optimal monetary policy,
this shock will have essentially the same qualitative effects (not reported here)
as the reserve-demand shock.26 And under jointly optimal fiscal and monetary
policies, the fiscal instrument will again be used to offset the friction in the equity
market, whereas optimal monetary policy will again opt for the same solution that
it would choose in the absence of this friction. The only difference is that the
optimal monetary policy response to a securitization-cost shock will be passive in
the absence of frictions. Indeed, as we pointed out earlier (based on the relevant
first-order conditions), banks will not engage in costly securitization if they have
access to funds in a frictionless equity market, so that shocks to securitization
costs will play no role in this case. Therefore, the optimal policy response to an
increase in securitization costs in the presence of frictions (not reported here) will
be purely fiscal, and this fiscal response will exactly offset the effects of the shock
(as a fiscal transfer from households to banks saves households the resource cost
of the securitization shock).
5. STRUCTURAL INTERPRETATIONS
In our model, the positive and normative implications of liquidity shocks (shocks
that increase the demand for bank reserves) depend critically on the presence of
funding frictions that banks face in the debt and equity markets. The friction we
considered in the debt (or securitization) market is a smooth version of the debt
limit that, following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), is often used to pin down the
financial structure of firms (or banks).27 Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Meh and
Moran (2010), and Gertler and Karadi (2011), among others, develop models in
which this agency problem puts a lower bound on the banks’ capital ratio (the
ratio of bank capital to loans). These contributions assume that banks cannot issue
equity. So the lower bound on the capital ratio and the evolution of the bankers’
personal net worth pin down the banks’ financial structure.
Gertler et al. (2012) consider an analogous agency problem between bank
managers (or inside equity holders) and (outside) shareholders. They retain the
basic structure of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), in which each banker is a member
of a particular household (serving as a model proxy for inside shareholders), but
also allow banks to issue equity to other households. The agency problem puts
an upper bound on the amount of equity finance, given the banker’s personal net
worth. In the model, bankers have an incentive to raise the maximum amount
of funds, subject to the limit on obligations that they can commit to honor, in
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the markets for debt and equity. So this model corresponds to setting very high
adjustment-cost parameters in our dividend-smoothing framework.
In Collard et al. (2012)—henceforth CDDL—we articulate an alternative way
of pinning down the capital structure of banks: prudential policy sets a minimum
capital ratio and the tax advantage of debt finance (over equity finance) gives
banks an incentive to rely on debt finance as much as they can. In CDDL we focus
on different conceptual issues (we do not consider policy responses to liquidity
shocks), but our framework is in sharp contrast to models with debt limits in that
our banks can readily change their financial structure; they just find equity finance
expensive.
Jermann and Quadrini’s (2009, 2012) work on the nonfinancial business sector
considers a tax distortion like the one in CDDL as well as adjustment costs as
in the model of the present paper. The estimates in Jermann and Quadrini (2009)
suggest that the tax distortion is the only relevant factor (the estimate of the
dividend smoothing parameter is essentially zero), but the estimates in Jermann
and Quadrini (2012) contradict this finding (suggest a positive dividend smoothing
parameter).
Studying the nature and degree of frictions in the market for bank equity seems
like an important topic for future research on quantitative models of monetary
policy.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have added banks and frictions in the market for bank capital to
the standard New Keynesian model. We have used this model to study the positive
and normative implications of a shock to the demand for bank reserves. This
shock serves to illustrate the effects of liquidity shocks of the type emphasized by
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). The existence of an equity market friction matters
significantly for the effects of this shock and the properties of optimal monetary
policy. Our main finding is that in response to an increase in the banks’ demand for
liquidity, optimal monetary policy accepts a significant output contraction. This
would not have been the case in the absence of the friction. Hence, monetary policy
becomes less accommodating to liquidity shocks under equity market frictions.
We also find that optimal policy (with or without the equity-market friction)
involves large adjustments in the money supply, a property reminiscent of Poole’s
analysis. Consequently, restrictions on the quantity of money supplied by the
central bank can carry significant welfare costs in times of financial turbulence.
Also, the presence of financial frictions and liquidity shocks does not invalidate the
well-known implication of the standard NK model that a simple interest-rate rule
that targets inflation is close to the optimal policy. There is a caveat here, though:
namely, that such a rule should target a measure of inflation that is relatively
insensitive to financial shocks.
Adding a fiscal instrument that allows making transfers to banks serves to
remove the equity-market friction in our model. That is, optimal policy with the
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two (fiscal and monetary) instruments in the presence of the friction leads to
the same equilibrium that optimal monetary policy would implement absent the
friction.
To be clear, some aspects of our results are likely to be sensitive to our modeling
choices. In particular, the inflationary effects of financial shocks in our model arise
in models that, like ours, include a cost channel of monetary transmission. The
details of how the policy rate optimally responds to shocks could be different,
for example, had we assumed that households (rather than producers of final
goods) borrow from banks. The point that is robust, and our main point, is that
optimal policy responses to a shock that affects the funding side of banks and the
usefulness of a fiscal instrument depend on what we assume about frictions in the
market for bank equity and other sources of funding. The main weakness of the
present analysis lies in its specification of these frictions. We have no guidance
from the existing literature for setting the parameters (a and z) that determine
the severity of the funding frictions that banks face. If we set either parameter to
zero, shocks to the funding side of banks will have no effect on the lending side.
Extensions that would model these frictions in a more compelling fashion appear
to us to be of high value added both from a positive and from a normative point
of view, especially regarding the properties of jointly optimal fiscal and monetary
policies.
NOTES
1. Because the standard New Keynesian (NK) model [e.g., Woodford (2003)] abstracted from
money and banking, a rapidly growing literature introduced banks into models of monetary policy to
address topical issues. Contributions include Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Hobijn and Ravenna (2010),
Meh and Moran (2010), and Gertler and Karadi (2011), among others.
2. This was indeed the presumption of some economists [e.g., Mulligan (2008)] who argued against
the U.S. bank-bailout plan informally, asserting that it was simply a transfer from taxpayers to the
owners of banks.
3. Our impression, based on conversations with central bankers in the United States and Europe, is
that banks argued against issuing new equity on the grounds that the equity premium was unreasonably
large at the time, and recapitalization via the stock market would not be in the interest of current
shareholders.
4. We adopt the dividend-smoothing specification of Jermann and Quadrini (2009, 2012) to capture
these frictions.
5. In the corporate finance literature, the observation that managers smooth dividends goes back
to Lintner (1956). Jermann and Quadrini (2012), drawing on earlier work, motivate it as a shortcut for
agency problems associated with the equity payout.
6. In particular, dividends are smooth in the models of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and
Karadi (2011), because banks only pay dividends when they are hit by a random exit shock (which
hits the same fraction of banks each period).
7. Fernández-Villaverde (2010) also addresses the issue of fiscal and monetary policies in the
presence of financial frictions, but from a very different perspective: in his model, the financial
frictions do not apply to a banking sector, fiscal policy consists in government expenditures financed
by distortive taxes and public debt, and fiscal and monetary policies are not optimal.
8. Securitization is equivalent to risk-free debt in our model because the aggregate default rate is
predictable and there are no information asymmetries in the model. In equilibrium, at will consist of
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bank liabilities (we can think of it as commercial paper or securitized loans) because we will assume
the government maintains a balanced budget.
9. Interpreting δt in terms of default is obviously stylized, and our discussion will not depend on
this shock in a substantive way (it only affects our numerical welfare calculations later). The shock
will serve two purposes in our model: it makes banking costly, and it leads to a distinction between
the price index for intermediate goods and the price of final goods. We could replace the shock with a
specification of banking costs and a productivity shock in the final-goods sector.
10. The retailers need funding in our model’s financial exchange to buy intermediate goods (and
the sellers of these goods use the funds to pay wages and dividends). As usual, our assumption that
these funds are borrowed from banks (rather than households) amounts to endowing banks with some
monitoring skills that are necessary to avoid fraud, etc.
11. The only reason we assume banks have market power is to remove the period-by-period
zero-profit condition that would be implied by a perfectly competitive banking sector. We could
not have random taxation (or fiscal transfers) in the banking sector while satisfying a zero-
profit condition at every date. Nor could we model dividend smoothing if our banks made zero
profits.
12. More specifically, final goods producers choose their portfolio of differentiated loans (li,t )1≤i≤nl
to maximize the Dixit–Stiglitz aggregator [
∑nl
i=1 l
sl
i,t ]
1
sl , where sl ≡ γl−1γl , subject to a budget constraint
of type
∑nl
i=1(1 + RLi,t )li,t ≤ Kl , whereas households choose their portfolio of differentiated deposits
(di,t )1≤i≤nd to minimize the Dixit–Stiglitz aggregator [
∑nd
i=1 d
sd
i,t ]
1
sd , where sd ≡ γd+1γd , subject to a
profitability constraint of type
∑nd
i=1(1 + RDi,t )di,t ≥ Kd .
13. The borrowing limit would represent a kink making the marginal cost infinite at a∗.
14. But these bonds are implicitly present because our monetary authority trades them in open
market operations.
15. We do not pursue quantitative results because our stylized model cannot match basic features of
banking sector data anyway. For example, in U.S. data, deposits and bank loans are three to four times
the size of quarterly consumption; in our model, consumption of “deposit goods” has to be smaller
than total consumption, and loans have to be about as large as output.
16. Setting z and a larger than 0.25 would make banks less willing to adjust dividend payments
and borrowing (securitization); this would make the effects of the liquidity shock larger under all the
policies we consider in further discussion, but it would not affect the qualitative features or comparisons
across policies that we will highlight.
17. We deactivate this shock throughout, except when we use impulse responses to highlight its
transmission mechanisms.
18. More precisely, the standard deviation σδ of the default shock innovation is set so that a variable
having a Gaussian probability distribution with mean zero and variance σ 2δ
(
1 + ρ2δ + ρ4δ + ρ6δ
)
exceeds
ln (2.88) − ln (0.86) with probability 1/320, where ρδ = 0.9 denotes the inertia in the default shock.
19. We conduct our analysis in the neighborhood of the steady state because, as mentioned at
the beginning of the Introduction, we focus in this paper on the effects of financial frictions on the
transmission of liquidity shocks in “normal times.”
20. More precisely, the optimal steady state deflation rate is about 0.04% per quarter, in all versions
of our model.
21. Some of the small responses in our IRFs also reflect general-equilibrium interactions that we
do not highlight in the text. For example, after an increase in demand for reserves, the interest rate on
deposits rises (because banks try to tap the deposit market more as their balance sheets tighten) and
consumers switch from buying cash goods to buying deposit goods. This reduces household demand
for money.
22. For a general discussion of the cost channel, see Christiano et al. (2010).
23. More precisely, we set nominal money growth equal to 1.15 times the steady-state inflation rate
minus 0.15 times the last quarter’s inflation rate. We need this negative response to lagged inflation to
get determinacy in our model.
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24. This reflects a small general-equilibrium interaction. The contraction of output reduces the
demand for loans, and banks compete to attract borrowers by cutting the interest rate on loans.
25. We suspect that the small contraction in consumption reflects the wealth effect of the decrease
in bank profits.
26. The only qualitative differences (which are quantitatively small) are in the responses of inflation
in the price of intermediate goods and the policy rate—optimal monetary policy raises the rate when
the liquidity shock arises from a shock that hampers securitization. This is because printing money is
not an effective way to deal with a liquidity shock that does not directly increase money demand.
27. Most applications involve additional model features that turn the inequality constraint, implied
by the debt limit, into an equality constraint. We worked instead with a smooth version to avoid solving
a Ramsey problem subject to an inequality constraint.
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